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The	end	of	foreign	policy	consensus?	How	Remainers
and	Leavers	view	Britain’s	place	in	the	world
Drawing	on	data	from	the	LSE’s	collection	of	materials	from	the	2016	referendum
campaign,	Benjamin	Martill	finds	that	the	Remain	and	Leave	camps	articulated	distinct	views
when	it	came	to	foreign	affairs.	The	findings	also	suggest	that	the	goals	of	British	foreign	policy
itself	are	likely	to	be	increasingly	subject	of	political	division	after	Brexit.
The	Brexit	vote,	we	are	told	repeatedly,	was	about	many	things:	immigration,	taking	back	control,
parliamentary	sovereignty,	judicial	independence,	and	the	ability	to	trade	freely.	In	contrast,
foreign	and	security	policy	seemed	to	feature	less	in	the	debate,	with	little	or	no	mention	of	NATO
or	the	EU’s	common	foreign	and	security	policies	in	the	referendum	campaign.
This	has	led	to	the	view	that	the	fallout	of	Brexit	will	be	more	manageable	than	in	other	areas,	since	Britain’s
interests	will	remain	the	same.	Coupled	with	the	primacy	of	NATO	in	European	security	and	defence	and	the	UK’s
unquestionable	support	for	the	Atlantic	alliance,	this	would	suggest	that	continuity	–	rather	than	change	–	will
characterise	British	foreign	policy	after	Brexit.
But	this	is	somewhat	optimistic,	since	the	Brexit	vote	was	animated	not	by	a	dislike	for	the	EU	alone,	but	by	deeper
beliefs	about	the	nature	of	the	world	and	the	appropriate	role	of	the	state	both	domestically	and	internationally
which	transcend	Euroscepticism.	In	short,	the	ideologies	–	or	worldviews	–	that	animated	the	vote	also	implicate
foreign	affairs,	and	view	Britain’s	role	in	the	world	very	differently	compared	with	those	worldviews	animating	the
Remain	vote.
Data	from	the	LSE’s	comprehensive	collection	of	materials	from	the	2016	campaign,	analysed	with	my	colleague
Adrian	Rogstad	at	the	University	of	Groningen,	suggests	a	number	of	systematic	differences	in	how	the	principal
Leave	and	Remain	campaign	organisations	viewed	Britain’s	place	in	the	world.	We	looked,	specifically,	at	how
these	organisations	represented	the	UK’s	position	in	relation	to	five	key	aspects	of	foreign	relations:	security,	ethics,
trade,	transnational	authority,	and	democratic	solidarity.
Different	Worlds
On	each	of	these	dimensions,	we	found	the	message	differed	significantly.	Material	from	the	Remain	campaign
made	much	of	Britain’s	institutional	membership,	arguing	this	gave	the	UK	clout	and	allowed	it	to	play	a	greater	role
than	it	would	otherwise.	In	contrast,	pro-Leave	leaflets	saw	British	power	and	prestige	(and	history)	as	the	main
sources	of	its	influence,	seeing	institutional	ties	as	constraints	on	British	power.	While	the	obvious	example	used	in
most	cases	was	the	EU,	the	claim	itself	when	deployed	by	both	campaigns	was	a	more	general	one,	with
Remainers	seeing	institutions	as	means	of	magnifying	British	influence	and	Leavers	seeing	them	as	illegitimate
constraints.
Both	stories	also	had	different	narratives	of	the	‘long	peace’	within	the	West	since	the	end	of	the	Second	World
War.	While	the	Remain	campaign	attributed	the	emergence	of	peace	to	the	EU,	which	–	they	argued	–	had	helped
to	overcome	centuries	of	conflict	between	European	nations,	the	Leave	campaign	argued	that	it	was	American
power	–	through	NATO	–	that	was	responsible	for	peace	in	Europe,	which	was	erroneously	attributed	to	the	EU.
Moreover,	while	the	Remain	campaign	sought	to	highlight	the	benefits	of	EU	enlargement	across	the	region,	Leave-
promoting	leaflets	represented	EU	expansion	as	a	dangerous	threat	to	regional	stability.
While	both	campaigns	spoke	of	the	benefits	of	free	trade,	closer	inspection	reveals	very	different	notions	of	what
free	trade	was.	For	the	Remain	campaign,	free	trade	was	viewed	through	an	institutional	lens,	and	much	of	their
material	highlighted	how	agreements	between	countries	–	including	the	EU	–	had	facilitated	the	expansion	of
economic	relations.	In	contrast,	the	Leave	campaign	viewed	the	question	of	trade	through	a	more	geopolitical,	neo-
mercantilist	lens,	arguing	patterns	of	trade	should	be	shifted	to	emerging	powers,	and	that	institutions	prevented	the
UK	from	doing	this.
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There	is	also	a	discernible	ethical	difference.	Remain	material	emphasised	cosmopolitan	themes	and	solidarity	with
other	European	nations,	as	well	as	the	benefits	of	British	engagement	with	the	rest	of	the	world	and	the	normative
good	this	produced.	In	contrast,	Leave	materials	portrayed	British	contributions	to	the	EU	budget,	along	with	the
UK’s	foreign	aid,	as	unjust	subsidies	that	could	have	been	better	spent	at	home,	evoking	a	more	communitarian
ethic.
And	finally,	both	campaigns	viewed	the	UK’s	set	of	partners	differently.	While	the	Remain	campaign	focused	on	the
democratic	credentials	of	the	UK’s	partners	(Europe,	the	‘West’),	Leave	materials	focused	much	more	on	the	UK’s
global	credentials	and	its	need	for	partnerships	with	new	global	power-centres	(read:	China)	which	need	not	be
democratic.
Foreign	Policy	Divergence
These	differences	point	to	divergent	worldviews	between	supporters	and	opponents	of	Brexit	on	key	foreign	policy
dimensions.	The	Remain	campaign	emphasised	the	value	of	supranational	authority,	the	EU’s	role	as	a
peacemaker,	the	need	for	institutionalised	free	trade,	the	importance	of	duties	outside	the	UK’s	borders,	and	the
need	for	democratic	partners;	the	Leave	campaign	offered	criticisms	of	each	of	these.
Of	course,	many	of	the	tropes	remain	the	same,	giving	a	surface	illusion	of	similarity.	Both	campaigns	spoke	about
the	UK	as	a	‘great’	global	actor,	for	instance.	But	mentions	by	the	Leave	campaign	equated	greatness	with	British
power	and	prestige	and	its	‘global’	history,	while	the	Remain	campaign	saw	greatness	as	a	product	of	the	UK’s
dependability	and	its	support	for	humanitarian	and	development	goals.
These	divergent	positions	are	important	for	two	reasons.	The	first	is	to	suggest	that	foreign	policy	is	becoming
increasingly	politicised	as	a	domain	of	policymaking.	Where	once	there	existed	a	fairly	stable	consensus	in	this
area,	it	is	now	clear	that	the	divisions	surrounding	Brexit	are	part	of	broader	divergence	in	how	British	citizens	view
their	country’s	role	in	the	world.	The	second	implication	is	that	the	liberal	(Remain)	basis	of	the	UK’s	foreign	policy
is	not	necessarily	as	strong	as	might	be	imagined.	Far	from	simply	removing	one	tool	of	foreign	influence	(the	EU),
the	Brexit	worldview	represents	a	repudiation	of	those	liberal	foreign	policy	goals	–	institutionalisation,
cosmopolitanism,	democratic	alliances	–	which	are	at	the	heart	of	the	UK’s	identity	as	an	international	actor.
Enter	Johnson
This	creates	a	more	challenging	environment	for	Boris	Johnson	in	the	years	ahead.	While	Brexiters,	whom	the
government	is	keen	to	appease,	may	be	satisfied	with	leaving	the	EU,	they	may	not	be	in	the	end.	The	referendum
campaign	highlighted	a	number	of	demands	that	go	beyond	the	UK’s	membership	of	the	EU:	engagement	with
emerging	powers,	reduction	of	foreign	and	development	aid,	freedom	from	supranational	control,	flexible	trading
arrangements,	strengthening	of	Anglo-American	relations.
These	would	amount	to	a	significant	shift	in	British	foreign	policy,	one	that	may	not	accord	with	the	expectations	of
the	UK’s	partners	or	fit	well	with	the	realities	of	the	UK’s	diminished	status	in	world	politics	in	the	post-war	period.
Johnson	may	resist	any	such	demands,	recognising	the	value	of	European	collaborative	efforts,	institutionalised
free	trade,	or	the	soft	power	of	Britain’s	aid	and	development	efforts.	Or	he	may	continue	to	pander	to	the	party	right
on	these	questions.	Either	way,	the	future	of	British	foreign	policy	remains	a	political	problem,	one	that	Brexit	alone
will	not	solve.
_________________
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	co-authored	article	in	Global	Affairs.
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